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ABSTRACT
Two-sided marketplaces such as eBay, Etsy and Taobao have two
distinct groups of customers: buyers who use the platform to seek
the most relevant and interesting item to purchase and sellers who
view the same platform as a tool to reach out to their audience
and grow their business. Additionally, platforms have their own
objectives ranging from growing both buyer and seller user bases
to revenue maximization. It is not difficult to see that it would be
challenging to obtain a globally favorable outcome for all parties.
Taking the search experience as an example, any interventions
are likely to impact either buyers or sellers unfairly to course cor-
rect for a greater perceived need. In this paper, we address how a
company-aligned search experience can be provided with compet-
ing business metrics that E-commerce companies typically tackle.
As far as we know, this is a pioneering work to consider multiple
different aspects of business indicators in two-sided marketplaces to
optimize a search experience. We demonstrate that many problems
are difficult or impossible to decompose down to credit assigned
scores on individual documents, rendering traditional methods in-
adequate. Instead, we express market-level metrics as constraints
and discuss to what degree multiple potentially conflicting metrics
can be tuned to business needs. We further explore the use of policy
learners in the form of Evolutionary Strategies to jointly optimize
both group-level and market-level metrics simultaneously, side-
stepping traditional cascading methods and manual interventions.
We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method
on Etsy data and demonstrate its potential with insights.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems → Learning to rank; Information re-
trieval diversity.
KEYWORDS
datasets, neural networks, learning to rank, evolutionary strategies,
e-commerce
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1 INTRODUCTION
As online shopping becomes a dominant avenue for global buyers,
E-commerce companies strive to meet a wide range of often con-
flicting goals when showing products for their communities. While
optimizing for buyer Conversion Rate, and therefore higher general
revenue or Gross-Merchandise-Value (GMV), is commonly consid-
ered the top objective, it is usually far from driving a healthy and
growing business. In fact, many E-commerce companies, especially
those with two-sided marketplaces, face a number of challenges due
to over-shackling to GMV optimization alone. Without appropriate
tempering, such a platform is usually unable to satisfy the short
term needs of buyers and sellers as well as the long term needs of
the business.
A typical two-sided marketplace such as eBay, Etsy and Taobao
has two distinct groups of customers where buyers use the platform
to seek the most relevant and interesting item to purchase and sell-
ers view the same platform as a tool to reach out to their audience
and grow their business. On top of that, the platform normally
would have its own objectives ranging from growing both buyer
and seller user bases to GMV maximization. It is not difficult to see
that it would be challenging to obtain a globally favorable outcome
for all parties.
Take showing relevant products to a buyer through the search
experience as an example. For a particular purchase intent, or some-
times with a specific item in mind, a buyer would likely discover a
spectrum of product listings from multiple sellers in a typical two-
sided marketplace. Some seem to be more relevant than others and
some even might look the same. A buyer has to decide among these
items with a positive experience such that he/she would return to
the marketplace next time. For sellers, however, they view search
result pages as prominent real estate to gain customers’ attention
and therefore potentially increase their market share. Maximizing
their success in search benefits both their brand and take home
pay, regardless of buyers’ overall experience on the site or ramifi-
cations to other sellers. On the mission of growing a marketplace,
the platform generally needs to step in and sometimes artificially
advantage under represented segments of sellers to give them more
exposure, creating a reasonably fair competition. However, it might
be equally risky to put established sellers in disadvantaged situa-
tions, who originally rank well on their own merit, and provide
a sub-standard experience to buyers as potentially fewer relevant
and lower quality goods are exposed higher through search results.
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This scenario exemplifies a microcosm of the marketplace: any
interventions are likely to impact either buyers or sellers unfairly to
course correct for a greater perceived need. On another hand, a two-
sided platform also needs to be cautious about the situation where
the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, namely the Matthew
Effect, a factor of constant battle in most marketplaces [2]. While
sellers often perform well due to better commercial strategies and
product fit than their peers, a healthy marketplace cannot be solely
dominated by a small segment of power sellers and continue to
grow. To make things even more complicated, platforms, often oper-
ating as modern corporations, subsequently attempt to compensate
for these inefficiencies with organizations and teams devoted to
their respective customer: for example, buyer, seller, and core mar-
ket. Hence, as each team attempts to solve a particular problem set,
competing needs are demanded of the search experience with each
team expecting tuning for their particular business focus. As often
these asks are ill-defined and heuristically measured, a grand chal-
lenge for building a search ranking algorithm to satisfy all fronts is
presented.
In this paper, we address how a company-aligned search ex-
perience can be provided with competing business metrics that
E-commerce companies typically tackle. As far as we know, this is a
pioneering work to consider multiple different aspects of business
metrics in two-sided marketplaces to optimize a search experience.
We demonstrate that many problems are difficult or impossible to
decompose down to credit assigned scores on individual documents,
rendering standard point-wise approaches to multi-objective [24]
or standard diversity-based[21] learning to rank algorithms inade-
quate. Instead, we express market-level metrics as constraints and
discuss to what degree multiple potentially conflicting objectives
can be tuned to business needs. In addition, we propose a policy
learner in the form of Evolutionary Strategies to jointly optimize
both group-level and market-level metrics simultaneously, side-
stepping traditional cascading methods and manual interventions.
The paper is organized as follows. In §2, we discuss related work
in several different directions. We then formulate and define a wide
range of metrics including relevancy metrics, diversity metrics and
a number of newly proposed market-level metrics relevant to E-
commerce interests in Section §3. We follow up with a proposed
set of policies to optimize the above metrics in §4. Finally in §5, we
empirically evaluate the effectiveness of proposed method on Etsy
search logs data, showing how different weightings influence the
ultimately delivered rankings.
2 RELATEDWORK
There are number of different facets of work that need to be con-
sidered when ranking across a variety of soft constraints.
2.1 Diversity
Diversity in Learning to Rank has long and storied past as it re-
lates to Web Search. The simplest solution typically falls under a
heuristic based approach. Carbonell and Goldstein[4] formulated
the problem as a selection: Documents are chosen greedily based
on a linear combination of query-document relevance and maximal
margin relevance (MMR), with each step picking the document
which the highest combined score. After selection, the MMR scores
are updated to reflect the newly picked document. MMR is rooted
in the idea of novelty, the idea that maximizing the differences in
similarity between the set of already selected documents and the
remaining set results in a more diverse outcome. Subsequent work
attempts to define better heuristics for selection [21]. Dang and
Croft propose PM-2 [11], a diversification method based on pro-
portionality; they argue diversification should be biased toward
the overall subtopic proportionality of the entire query-set rather
than attempting to balance it uniformly. xQuAD [22] attempts to
understand diversity as a combination of an originating query and
derived sub-queries.
In the learning space, the closest related work comes from Xia
et al. who describe PAMM [27], a method for optimizing diversity
and relevancy via a Perceptron. Novel to the paper is the idea of
direct optimization of the evaluation metrics rather than utilizing
heuristics or optimizing surrogate functions. PAMM works gener-
ally by sampling both positively and negatively ranked lists and
attempts to maximize the margin between them.
Crucially, all of the above attempt to solve the challenge of query
ambiguity; the idea that redundancy is undesired due to lack of
strong conviction of the topicality of a given query. This positions
the frameworks to satisfy the needs of the searcher, with the un-
derlying objective of improving the browser’s experience. While
two-sided marketplaces face similar challenges to query ambiguity,
they also need to balance the needs of the seller: diversity for the
sake of mitigating bias. To our knowledge, none of the proposed
work attempt to optimize for market-level diversity metrics.
2.2 Policy Learning
Policy optimization in LTR space has come in a few flavors over the
years, with most of its history focused in online LTR. Radlinski et al.
[17] first discussed diversity-based online optimization in the form
of using multi-armed bandits to minimize page abandonment. They
condition the expected reward on previous documents selected,
considering each remaining document an "arm", allowing for suit-
able exploration/exploitation trade-off against the expected reward.
More recent work proposes modeling user behavior as an MDP[13]
with the goal of learning how browser sessions can be utilized in
re-ranking. They proceed to describe a policy gradient method to
learn optimal ranking policies given the learned SS-MDP.
Most applicable to our proposed policy is utilizing black box
optimization in learning to rank. Salimans et al. recently showed
that Evolutionary Strategies [20] were well suited for learning rein-
forcement problems, applying a variation of ES known as Natural
Evolutionary Strategies[26] to Atari game learning. They proposed
a scalable algorithm and demonstrated the optimizer’s tolerance
to stochastic environments. [7] showed competitive results to Sal-
imans via Canonical ES - a simpler version of the (λ, 1) variants
of Evolutionary Strategies. Concurrently, Ibrahim et al. applied
perhaps the simplest type of (1+1)-Evolutionary Strategies to learn
policies on linear models to directly optimize the average nDCG
across all query sets[14].
2.3 Popularity Bias and the Matthew Effect
Measuring market level performance within search is fairly under
researched in the space of E-Commerce. Perhaps closest to our
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particular use case is from Hentenryck et al. [25] who analyzed the
impacts of social influence on a trial-offer market, showing that
ranking on conditional purchase rate lead to natural monopolies
by the highest quality products. Follow up work attempts to com-
pensate for the Matthew Effect [2] by intervening with a stochastic
policy to randomize products of similar quality. They show how
segmenting products into different "worlds" and conditioning pop-
ularity on which world a user observes results in a stable market
where products of similar quality obtain equivalent market share.
3 METRICS FOR OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we outline metrics for optimization from a typical
two-sided marketplace. We review classic relevancy metrics in §3.1
as well as diversity metrics in §3.2, serving the foundation of metrics
for modern search ranking. We introduce a new class of market-
level metrics in §3.3. We list all notations used through out the
paper in Table 1.
Table 1: Notation
Notation Description
Q = {q1, ...,qn } Unique query set
Ni Number of documents in query set qi
D = {d1, ...,dj } Document set
Feats(di ) Feature vector for document di
Y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} Relevance grades
yi, j ∈ Y Relevance score for qi and dj
π Ranking policy
R(π ,qi ) =< d1, . . .) > Ranked documents for query qi
V (π ,qi ,dj ) Evaluator for query-doc set
S(π ,Q,D) ∈ [0, 1] Market-level objective function
3.1 Relevancy Metrics
First and foremost is the concept of relevancy, rooted originally in
the well-known Probability Ranking Principle (PRP) framework [9,
19] which states that documents should be ordered independently in
decreasing presentation of relevance. That is, the most relevant doc-
ument for a query should be placed first. To measure that principal,
industry has standardized around two core metrics for evaluating
the efficacy of their ranking systems: NDCG [16] and ERR [6]. We
now give a brief overview of their formulation.
Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG): NDCG is
an ordered relevance metric measuring the agreement between a
goldset list of documents and the permutation return by the ranking
policy. It is typically evaluated to some position K , indicating only
the first K documents should be considered for evaluation. Usually
values are small, emphasizing the importance of getting the first
few documents correct. Given a query qi :
DCG@K =
K∑
j=1
2yi, j − 1
log2(i + 1)
NDCG@K = DCG@KIDCG@K ∈ [0, 1]
(1)
Where IDCG is the best possible DCG score for the given query-doc
set. We typically evaluate the average NDCG@K across all queries.
Expected Reciprocal Rank (ERR): ERR [6] is proposed as an
adjustment to NDCG, attempting to factor in a prior to how users
actually consider documents for engagement. While graded labels
are still assigned to documents independently, ERR is grounded on
the idea of the cascade user model [10]: that previous evaluations
of documents influences the likelihood that a buyer will continue
browsing. While a full discussion on ERR is out of the scope of
this paper, we provide the following formulation used in evalua-
tion. Given some mapping R of relevance grades to probability of
relevance, we can define ERR as:
R(д) = 2
д − 1
2max(Y )
p0 = 1,pj = pj−1(1 − R(yi, j ))
ERR0 = 0,ERRj = ERRj−1 + pj−1
R(yi, j )
j
3.2 Diversity Metrics
Evaluation of sub-topic diversity is a rich field with many contri-
butions [1, 5, 8, 28]. Generally, the metrics revolve around the idea
that there exist ambiguity in the intent behind a query. For example,
while there is likely a strong relationship between the query “lace
bridal veil” and the /clothing/wedding/accessory/veils taxon-
omy, for other queries there is less implicit understanding. On Etsy,
we serve a large number of inspirational (cheerful, happy, beautiful),
stylistic (geometric, upcycled, animal print), and occasion (gifts for
him, bridesmaid presents, stocking stuffers) queries which have
high taxonomic (interchangeably used with topicality) ambiguity.
In cases where there is low certainty of strong topicality, ranking
benefits from increasing coverage of different sub topics early on
in the presented result set. Indeed, empirical results have shown
increasing diversity improves user engagement metrics [18].
ERR-IA: ERR-IA [6] is an extension to ERR that incorporates the
notion of diversity. Let Pr(t | q) be the probability of a topic, t, for
a given query, q. We can define ERR-IA as:
R(yi , t) =
{
R(yi ) i ∈ t
0 else
ERRIA@K =
K∑
j=1
1
j
∑
t
Pr(t | q)
j−1∏
i=1
(1 − R(yi , t))R(yj , t)
Or, using the ERR formula from before, we can define it as:
scores = [yi ∗ 1[i ∈ catt ],∀i ∈ [1,K]]
ERRIA@K =
∑
t
Pr(t | q) ∗ ERR@K(scores) (2)
3.3 Market-Level Metrics
Two sided marketplaces, unlike traditional web search, suffers from
multiple challenges typically framed in the form of inequality; the
realization that there exists some skew in the marketplace we wish
to correct. In this sub section we introduce a wide range of differ-
ent types of market corrections and present potential metrics for
optimization. Before we introduce the first proposed metric, we
discuss the notion of query-set dependence below.
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Query-Set Dependence: At first glance, many metrics seem
like they could be modeled as group-wise diversity problems. Let
us consider the case of balancing between highly successful power
sellers and new sellers on the site. While majority of the sales will
come from a fraction of the entire seller base, an over saturation of
a small proportion of sellers in search has the potential to squeeze
out new shops on the site. As there is strong evidence that faster
time to first sale increases a seller’s Life Time Value (LTV), we would
ideally like to improve their exposure. Applying a diversity con-
straint between power sellers and new sellers seems reasonable:
for each query set, increase coverage between the two distributions
in the top K spots. However, this ignores a fundamental problem:
different queries have different amounts of traffic associated with
them, preventing us from properly balancing the market. Much
like the PRP models before, diversity metrics assume query-level
independence: we only consider how the impact of diversification
adjusts the metrics within each query set, not its contribution to
the overall market place. Another simple example can illustrate the
differences. If we have two ranked sets of items, whereN indicates a
new seller and P indicates a power seller, for rankings {P , P ,N ,N }
and {N ,N , P , P}, the average diversity scores for both queries will
be low. However, from an inequality perspective, both power sellers
and new sellers have equal representation in top spots, satisfying
the market level needs. Overall, we can write our general market
indicator function with only a slight abuse of notation as:
I (S |Qπ ), S ∈ [0, 1] (3)
where Qπ is the rankings of all documents across all queries by
policy π .
3.3.1 Weighted Importance Ranking. This leads us to our first pro-
posed metric: Weighted Importance Ranking. Under the assumption
that we want to balance some scoring function Ssub according to
some importance weighting, such as traffic volume, we can describe
our score function S as:
S(π ) =
∑N
i=1Wi ∗ Ssub (π ,qi ,di )∑N
i=1Wi
(4)
This provides a useful feedback mechanism to the policy learner:
much like the intuition that rankers optimizing for NDCG or ERR
should focus their energy on improving the rank of documents
higher in the page, providing importance feedback provides guid-
ance to the policy on which queries it should focus time on opti-
mizing.
3.3.2 Outlier Skew. When dealing with implicit feedback data,
chronic cold starts, or otherwise uncertainty in the relevance set,
optimizing for the expected NDCG across all queries can lead to
an over-sensitivity to outliers: query sets that are either trivial or
impossible to successfully rank given the features.
To address the influence, we propose a simple change to the
optimization function to maximize the scores at given percentiles
instead of the mean. Given the set of scores,M , a set of percentiles
to evaluate (e.g. 25th, 75th, etc.), Percentiles:
M = {V (π ,q1,dq ), ...,V (π ,qN ,dN )}
S(π ) =
∑
p∈PercentilesM(p)
|Percentiles|
(5)
Figure 1: Seller Distribution
Empirically, we have found that optimizing quantiles can provide a
smoother distribution.
3.3.3 Incentives. Many cases where business wishes to correct
market bias can boil down to minimizing arbitrage. For example, it
might be observed that Buyers find items with low list prices attrac-
tive and yet are surprised when confronted with costly shipping.
Sellers will often discover these user behaviors can yield a higher
collection of clicks, a standard ranking signal, and will list items
with artificially low prices to improve their ranking in Search.
Incorporating incentives in a principled way is difficult. As a
marketplace which caters to many different price points, many
of which are materially cheap to produce, this rules out simple
heuristics or other hard rules. Analysis might come up with some
rule, say listing prices lower than the median value of a product
should be down weighted in search (also known as burying), but
that goes too far: we now penalize sellers producing goods more
efficiently.
Rather than exert a hard penalty as a group-wise metric, we
instead propose a simple maximization approach across the top
ranked documents for all queries. Given some user-provided be-
havior function, B, indicating that a document for a given query
exhibits a quality we wish to incentivize, a ranking of documents
for query qi , and the number of positions, K , to consider:
pos ∈ {1, ...,Ni }
B(qi ,dj ) = 0, 1
S(π ) =
∑ |Q |
i=1
∑K
p=0 B(qi ,R(π ,qi )@p)
K |Q |
(6)
Combined with Weighted Importance Ranking in Equation 4, we
can influence desired behaviors conditioned on relevance and group-
level diversity.
3.3.4 Inequality. The final class of market level metrics fall un-
der the guise of inequality: some imbalance in wealth distribution
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across tiers of sellers that we wish to correct. Without interven-
tions, marketplaces often fall under the phenomena of the Matthew
Effect; wealth accumulates in a small segment of the population,
squeezing out other Sellers. Etsy is no different: Figure 1 shows
how visibility accumulates in the wealthy few: the top few% of
sellers account for the bulk of sales. Indeed, it can be shown that
models that maximizing conditional purchase rate will result in
natural monopolies [25] due to social signals present in the market-
place (reviews, best sellers, number of sales, etc.). While beneficial
to maximizing sales, it carries inherent business risk: any loss of
sellers occupying the monopoly positions for popular queries will
have outsize effect on bottom line KPIs.
While work has been done examining how different rankings can
impact a market’s health (e.g. maximizing number of purchases) [2],
there is little discussion on improving proportional representation
across tiers of sellers jointly.
Given our desire to influence inequality, we examine two meth-
ods for flattening the distribution, depending on the amount of
prior information we have.
Gini Index: In the case where we can estimate or measure
the wealth distribution apriori, we propose minimizing the Gini
Index[12], also known as the Gini Coefficient, across all query sets.
Based on the Lorenz Curve, it estimates the difference between
full income equality and the actual observed wealth distribution of
different sub populations. Given a cumulative proportion of the pop-
ulation, Xi and a cumulative proportion of wealthWi , ordered such
thatwi/xi ≤ wi+1/xi+1 we can define the Gini Index indicator:
Gini = 1 −
|X |∑
i=2
(Xi − Xi−1)(Wi +Wi−1)
S(π ) = 1 − Gini
There are a number of different ways to compute the popula-
tion: total count of different sub populations across all inventory,
such as seller deciles, the subset represented in the train dataset,
etc. Similarly, there are many ways we can measure wealth; for
E-commerce businesses, purchase count per query can be a reason-
able approximation for seller wealth where, given some function
IsSubPop:
wi =
|Q |∑
j=1
IsSubPop(π ,qj , i) · Purchases(qj )
In the case where we are more interested in the traffic distribu-
tion, W can be set to the amount of query volume. For simplicity,
in our experiments, we compute Gini for rank=1. However, com-
puting the Gini Coefficient over multiple rank positions is similarly
straight forward if we have access to the observation probability O
of a document at position p (such as from a click model):
O(Pos) ∈ [0, 1]
Spos(π ) = O(p) ∗ Gini (7)
χ2 Uniformity: In cases where P and W are unknown, we can
use a simpler method for measuring inequality: maximizing the
inverse of the χ2 fit against a uniform distribution:
Count(π , cat) =
K∑
p=1
|Q |∑
i=1
IsCat(π ,R(π ,qi ,p), cat)
χ2unif orm =
∑
c ∈C (Count(π , c) − |Q ||C | )2
|Q |
|C |
S(π ) = 1
1 + χ2Uniform
(8)
4 ALGORITHM OVERVIEW
Learning a ranking policy requires multiple levels of information:
individual scores in the case of relevancy, group-level metrics for
diversity, andmarket-level to account for a variety of skews. Further
difficulty arises from the large number of rank orderings: many
metrics are neither continuous or differentiable.
To optimize the policies, we compose a linear combination of all
metrics (e.g. NDCG, incentives, gini, etc) into a final Fitness Function,
which our proposed optimizer tries to maximize.
F (π ) =
∑ |S |
i=1Wi · Si (π )∑ |S |
i=1Wi
(9)
Below we describe a greedy, group-level policy optimizing ei-
ther a static or stochastic value function followed by a proposed
optimizer to learn the policies.
4.1 Greedy Algorithm
As has been shown through numerous previous works[21], the
assumption of independence during prediction is violated when
considering group-level diversity. Consequently, most work on
diversity utilize a heuristic, second pass algorithm to select sub-
sequent documents during the ranking process. However, Zhai
et al. showed that a simple greedy algorithm performed well in
maximizing MMR[28]1:
Algorithm 1: Greedy Algorithm
1 Input: parameters σ , value function v , documents D
2 Output: ⟨d1,d2, ...,dk ⟩
3 for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., K do
4 di = arg max
d ∈D
v(σ ,di , ⟨d1,d2, ...,di−1⟩)
5 D = D − {di }
6 end
4.1.1 Static Value Functions. While the greedy policy classically
focuses on a heuristic document similarity as the selection criteria
for the value function, we instead learn a parameterization over
the greedy algorithm and utilize a simple average over the features
of previously selected documents to represent aggregate state.
We define a static value function as:
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s1 = 0, si =
∑i−1
j=1 Feats(di )
i − 1
v(σ ,di , ⟨d1, ..,di−1⟩) = Φ(σ , si−1 − Feats(di ))
(10)
where Φ is a fully connected neural network.
4.1.2 Stochastic Value Functions. In this section we introduce a
stochastic value function, SVF for short. Queries are assumed inde-
pendent much the same way that the PRP assumed documents can
be arranged independently of each other. However, it’s easy to see
how this assumption is violated.
Revisiting the previous example of new sellers and power sellers,
we present a set of rankings from two policies π1 and π2:
Q1π1 = {P ,N , P ,N },Q2π1 = {P ,N , P ,N }
Q1π2 = {N , P ,N , P},Q2π2 = {N , P ,N , P}
It is clear that the group level diversity metrics for each policy
are optimal given these two seller categories, but also equally clear
that the diversity of sellers occupying the first position is poor. In
expectation, one can also see how blending the two policies would
result in the highest overall reward:
π = arg max
p∈{π1,π2 }
Uniform(0, 1))
Inspired by the observation that neural networks can be viewed
as an exponential set of sub-networks [23] and the above observa-
tion, we introduce a simple stochastic feature into the network to
allow for the blending of learned sub-policies:
f ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
v(σ ,di , ⟨d1, ..,di−1⟩) = Φ(σ , (si−1 − Feats(di )) ⊕ f ) (11)
Rather than break apart θ into explicit policy sets, we rely on
feature masking in 2 to produce thinned, sub-networks for optimiza-
tion, deferring to the optimizer to learn how best to incorporate
the noise.
4.2 Evolutionary Strategies
Learning a policy that devolves into various forms of sorting is
difficult; given slight variations to the underlying parameters can
result in large swings in scores. To solve this challenge, we reach
for recent work using ES from the LTR and Reinforcement Learning
space to maximize our desired objectives. Below we provide a high
level description of the (1 + λ) variety of ES.
Given a parameter set θ (henceforth known as the parent), a
fitness function f , and shaping function H , we sample λ search
gradients from the Normal distribution: i ∈ {1, 2, .., λ}, ϵi ∼ N(µ, I )
where µ = 0 and I = 1 are typical parameters for the noise dis-
tribution; while both Salimans and Chrabaszcz explored adjust-
ing I , neither found it significantly changed the results. We fur-
ther augment the algorithm by masking parameters with proba-
bility (p), reducing the effective search space per pass [14]. For
each search gradient, we compute its fitness with respect to the
parent Fitnessi = f (θparent + ϵi ). We proceed to run all scores
through a shaping function which scales each gradient by some
rank function to smooth out the impact of outlier fitness scores:
ϵ ′i = ϵi ∗ H (Fitnessi , Fitness∗). We compute our candidate parent
as the sum of gradients scaled by σ and compare it to the previous
parent, replacing the parent if the candidate improves.
P = {θparent,θparent + σ ∗
λ∑
i=1
ϵ ′i }
θ = arg max
p∈P
F (p)
There are a few variations which are commonly used. The first is
always updating θparent = θcandidate regardless of improvement of
fitness. The second is with respect to the shaping function: Wierstra
et al. explored the impact of fitness shaping functions in Natural
Evolutionary Strategies [26] and found that so long as they were
monotonic with respect to utility rank, they improved the robust-
ness. The final one is the number of Search gradients used during
candidate construction, which also correspond to the theoretical
underpinnings: Salimans et al. used all gradients as part of its com-
putation due to assumptions made in NES whereas [7] implement
a canonical variant which only uses the best µ children.
We consolidate all of these variants into the following general-
ized (1 + λ) − ES algorithm in 2.
Algorithm 2: Generalized (1 − λ)-ES
1 Input: θ0 - parameters, F - fitness function, H - shaping
function, (p) - mask probability, update ∈ {True, False},
λ ∈ I+, µ ∈ I+, iters ∈ I+
2 for i = {1, 2, .., iters} do
3 for c = {1..λ} do
4 ϵc ∼ N(0, 1) · Bern (p)
5 sc = F (θi−1 + ϵc )
6 end
7 Sort(ϵ∗, s∗) in non-increasing order {s1 ≥ s2 ≥ ..sλ }
8 θcandidate = θi−1 +
∑µ
j=1 ϵj · H (sj , {s1, s2, .., sµ })
9 if update then
10 θi ← θcandidate
11 else
12 P = {θi−1,θcandidate }
13 θi ← Parg max
p∈P
F (p)
14 end
15 end
We add a few additions on top of the Generalized ES algorithm.
First we observe that the Greedy policy complexity is O(N 2), lead-
ing to severe slowdown on large document sets during training. To
mitigate this, we uniformly sub-sample the document set each pass,
for each query. While left as a hyper parameter, we found setting it
to twice the K value used to compute NDCG sufficient for conver-
gence. Secondly, we add batching instead of optimizing the entire
dataset at once. Finally, we utilize the the masking strategy as in
ES-Rank[14] except that we sample from the Bernoulli distribution
with some probability (p).
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Figure 2: Population vs Price
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we firstly discuss the data we use in experiments in
§5.1 and then we discuss our baselines and chosen implementation
details in §5.2 and finally we analyze results in §5.3.
5.1 Data
Our training set is extracted from production search logs, con-
taining the top 5,000 queries observed over an eight day period.
Document features are a combination of query relevancy, historical
performance, and taxonomic information. We further augment the
dataset with a variety of metadata:
Population, Wealth, Observation: Seller population scores are
based on GMV vigintiles: Etsy, like most e-commerce sites, exhibits
a heavy power law distribution with respect to dollar shares. We
compute the observation model by summing the number of pur-
chases over a week at each rank position and dividing by the total
number of purchases observed. Wealth is calculated by summing
the total number of purchases per query over the same week as the
observation model.
Diversity: Listings taxonomy is used as the source of diversity in
queries. Overall, it has 175 different categories with a large class
imbalance.
Incentives: We binarize our product prices by the mean listing
value in our sampled search results. Price has a sharp skew (3)
toward lower cost items, often times washing out higher quality,
more labor intensive products. We add an incentive toward pre-
mium prices to boost high quality listings closer to the top of the
rankings.
Gini vs Price: As can be seen in figure (2), listing price and popula-
tion counts are inversely correlated, illustrating a common problem
faced by e-commerce: improving the Gini Index naturally results
in a reduction in listing price.
5.2 Algorithms
Baselines: We compare two different baselines to affirm efficacy
of our approach. We first look at the venerable Maximal Marginal
Relevance [4] where the relevance model is learned using Lamb-
daMART [3] optimized for NDCG@10. Document similarity is based
Figure 3: Price Distribution
Table 2: Weight Variants
Variant Relevance Group Diversity Gini Index Incentive
-{0,0} 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-{0.05,0.05} 0.85 0.05 0.05 0.05
-{0.1,0.1} 0.70 0.10 0.10 0.10
-{0.17,0.17} 0.49 0.17 0.17 0.17
-{0.25,0.25} 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
-{0.3,0.3} 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.30
-{0.05,0} 0.90 0.00 0.05 0.05
-{0.1,0} 0.80 0.00 0.10 0.10
-{0.25,0} 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.25
-{0.33,0} 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33
-{0.4,0} 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.40
on the Jaccard of each document’s taxonomy. We tune the blend
parameter λ by maximizing the weighted sum of scores between all
indicators. The second model is optimized using the same general-
ized ES algorithm above, however we replace the greedy policy with
a standard pointwise inference policy, sorting documents based on
their learned scores.
Evolutionary Strategies: In our experiments we compare ES poli-
cies trained against a variety of different metrics:
• Relevancy scores measured as NDCG@10 (1)
• Groupwise diversity using ERR-IA@10 (2) across different
taxonomic groups
• Market indicators: Gini1 and Incentives1 (6)
We combine these into our fitness function, F , via a weighted linear
combination in EQ 9 with weights described in Table 2. We explore
two different policies: a standard point-wise baseline and a greedy
policy (1). We use the generalized form of Canonical Evolutionary
Strategies, fixing λ = 768 and µ = 50 for all tests. We set update to
True and fix (p) at 0.05. We compare three different variations of
our proposed models: Greedy with a static value function, Greedy
with a stochastic value function, and Pointwise with a stochastic
value function. For Φ, we use a small fully connected neural net
(20→ 20→ 1) utilizing the ReLU[15] non-linearity. When utilizing
stochastic value functions, we evaluate the test set 5 times with
different random seeds to determine expected performance.
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Figure 4: Lorenz Curve (SG-ES)
Figure 5: Gini - SG-ES vs. SP-ES
5.3 Experimental Analysis
To verify efficacy of our approach, we examine a few different axes
in fitness. To tease apart how different weights impact the overall
model, we first examine how market indicator constraints impact
relevancy across the different policies. We follow it up by examining
to what degree relevancy, group-level, and indicators can jointly
optimize all metrics simultaneously. We finally compare stochastic
vs static policies and to what degree it improves the model.
Comparison to Baselines: Unsurprisingly, we see in Table 3 that
while MMR does best with respect to ERR-IA and NDCG, it is at
the expense of both Incentives and Gini index which it is unable
to optimize. Similarly, while the Pointwise-ES baseline does well
on Gini and Incentives, it performs worse of all the policies on
group level diversity, which is not surprising due to document
independence assumptions. Importantly, all ES policies were able to
optimize all metrics compared to the baseline, providing evidence
of its efficacy.
Influence on Market Indicators: We evaluated variants by ad-
justing the importance weight for the Gini Index and Incentives in
5. Compared to the baselines, we were able to progressively and
smoothly improve both the Gini Index and Incentive indicators with
both stochastic and static Greedy variants. We find that weight does
Table 3: Policy Comparison of Baselines Across All Metrics
Variant (2) Metric Validation Test Mean Test Std
MMR-LambdaMART ERR-IA 0.487 0.480 -
P-ES-{0.17,0.17} ERR-IA 0.481 0.467 -
SP-ES-{0.17,0.17} ERR-IA 0.484 0.468 0.001
G-ES-{0.17,0.17} ERR-IA 0.489 0.475 -
SG-ES-{0.17,0.17} ERR-IA 0.478 0.471 0.002
MMR-LambdaMART Gini 0.795 0.800 -
P-ES-{0.17,0.17}* Gini 0.925 0.891 -
SP-ES-{0.17,0.17}* Gini 0.894 0.888 0.029
G-ES-{0.17,0.17}* Gini 0.883 0.881 -
SG-ES-{0.17,0.17}* Gini 0.911 0.889 0.011
MMR-LambdaMART Incentive 0.396 0.403 -
P-ES-{0.17,0.17}* Incentive 0.466 0.525 -
SP-ES-{0.17,0.17}* Incentive 0.466 0.518 0.002
G-ES-{0.17,0.17}* Incentive 0.470 0.543 -
SG-ES-{0.17,0.17}* Incentive 0.466 0.543 0.009
MMR-LambdaMART NDCG 0.692 0.679 -
P-ES-{0.17,0.17} NDCG 0.655 0.637 -
SP-ES-{0.17,0.17} NDCG 0.652 0.634 0.001
G-ES-{0.17,0.17} NDCG 0.662 0.651 -
SG-ES-{0.17,0.17} NDCG 0.652 0.642 0.001
* indicates stat. sig. compared to MMR (P < 0.005).
indeed improve the overall equality of the system compared to its
unconstrained form 4.
Table 4: Gini Index: Stochastic vs. Static (Variant ES-{0.4,0})
Variant Validation Test Mean Test Std
G-ES-{0.4,0} 0.906 0.798 0.000
SG-ES-{0.4,0} 0.922 0.903 0.008
Joint Optimization of all Metrics: We found we were able to op-
timize multiple metrics simultaneously as seen in Figure 6. Despite
the conflicting nature of the metrics, ES was able to find policies
that improved the underlying metrics compared to the baselines.
Stochastic Features: Stochastic value functions were competitive
with their static brethren. We find that the additional noise had a
few benefits: first, it helped regularize the networks; we find the
difference between train and test scores were narrower than the
static variants. Furthermore, the stochastic variants were smoother:
they had lower variance as importance weighting increased. Table
4 exemplifies the differences when considering only market indica-
tors and relevance. Table 5 shows how the stochastic policy is more
reliable with generalization from validation to the test set. Unlike
the greedy variant, SVFs applied to pointwise models were unable
to stably improve market indicators. Figure 5 compares stochastic
pointwise and greedy algorithms on different importance weight-
ings - while greedy is fairly smooth, the pointwise model displays
high variance both within policy and across different weightings.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper we defined types of market indicators critical for cre-
ating healthy, two-sided marketplaces and proposed strategies for
learning policies to jointly maximize those desired market char-
acteristics. We showed that we can influence these market-level
metrics via our models, resulting in a method for imposing business
needs while eliminating many of the common forms of interven-
tions that lead to sub-par search experiences.
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Figure 6: Fitness scores from each iteration - SG-ES-{0.0,0.0}
(top) and SG-ES-{0.17,0.17} (bottom). The horizontal dashed
lines display the baseline MMR-LambdaMART scores for
each metric matched by color.
Table 5: Gini Index: Stochastic vs. Static
Variant (2) Validation Test Mean Difference
G-ES-{0,0} 0.740 0.849 -0.109
SG-ES-{0,0} 0.734 0.789 -0.065
G-ES-{0,0.05} 0.815 0.883 -0.068
SG-ES-{0,0.05} 0.854 0.853 0.001
G-ES-{0,0.1} 0.825 0.899 -0.074
SG-ES-{0,0.1} 0.881 0.861 0.020
G-ES-{0,0.17} 0.883 0.881 0.002
SG-ES-{0,0.17} 0.911 0.889 0.012
G-ES-{0,0.25} 0.924 0.861 0.063
SG-ES-{0,0.25} 0.901 0.879 0.022
G-ES-{0,0.3} 0.945 0.876 0.069
SG-ES-{0,0.3} 0.925 0.874 0.051
There are many possible directions for future work. One is to
explore stochastic models in online environments versus just offline
demonstrated in this paper. Another possible direction is to explore
more efficient algorithms as ES comes at significant cost of sample
efficiency, often using orders of magnitude more compute than
other, more efficient policy gradient optimizers. The last one is to
see how these ideas can be utilized in a production system.
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